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Professors Colin Gray and Geoffrey
Sloan of Reading University once
averred that geography is “the mother of
strategy.” Geography generates context
and constraints at all levels of conflict,
but its most acute impact is at the strategic level, as a producer of commanding
advantage. Geography has lost its niche
in academia, and pundits extol the virtues of a smaller world, but they intrepidly overlook enduring realities. For all
the talk about the flattening of the globe
(via the Internet, social media, collaborative software, and tightly integrated
economies), geography still matters to
strategists and international relations.
Ambrose Bierce said that war was
“God’s way of teaching Americans
geography.” Although our geographic
illiteracy has grown over the past
decades, geography still dominates
strategy and geopolitics. Even as
information technology proves to be
enormously valuable as the real-time
disseminator of ideas (and the source
of a new domain of conflict), the actual
application of politics and military
power occurs in physical domains, and
any strategy must observe the realities
of time, space, distance, and geography.
This is why Robert Kaplan’s latest book,
The Revenge of Geography, is so timely
and relevant. It is also his most intellectual work, reflecting years of thought
and travel to troubled dark spots. Ever
since his breakout book, The Coming
Anarchy (2001), Kaplan has reported
on the confluence of culture, history,
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and conflict. His insights, borne of
personal research, have been consistently dystopic but unerringly prophetic.
In this, his fourteenth book, Kaplan
provides a scholarly view into the past
and the future. The first part provides
an overview of the “Visionaries,” the
original geostrategists. Kaplan dissects
the geopolitical articulations of Halford
Mackinder (of the Heartland), the less
known German Karl Haushofer, our
own Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Dutch
American Nicholas Spykman (and his
Rimlands), and the Austrian émigré
Robert Strausz-Hupe (former U.S.
ambassador to Turkey and founder of
the Foreign Policy Research Institute).
In the back half of the book, the author
applies the various theories via a tour of
the world, with a focus on the influence
of the early twenty-first-century map.
Kaplan recognizes the influence of
geography on nations and history, and
he does not adhere to a deterministic approach. There are other factors,
such as culture and demography, but
“the only thing enduring is a people’s
position on a map,” he suggests. “With
the political ground shifting rapidly
under one’s feet, the map, though not
determinative,” he adds, “is the beginning of discerning a historical logic
about what might come next.”
The fact that military power must be
applied in a distinct geographic context
or domain—over, under, or upon the
globe—is not news to naval officers.
Mahan, of course, was a noted geostrategist, and he is given his due by
Kaplan. Naval readers will find chapter
7, “The Allure of Sea Power,” useful and
Mahan’s ideas about maritime concerts
of democratic states possibly appealing.
Also quite noteworthy is Kaplan’s
chapter entitled “The Geography of

1

2/26/13 8:48 AM

1 3 0 	nava l wa r c o l l e g e r e v i e w

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 2, Art. 17

Chinese Power.” Here the author notes
that China has resolved its land-border
disputes and has shifted its attention
to “a more hostile environment at sea,”
where the “first island chain” (Japan,
Taiwan, etc.) constrains Chinese access
to markets and resources. China is
now in the early stages of becoming a
sea power, and Kaplan contends that
China “in the twenty-first century will
project hard power primarily through
its navy.” Ironically, the Chinese “have
absorbed the aggressive philosophy of
Alfred Thayer Mahan, without having
graduated yet to the blue-water oceanic force that would make it possible
to apply Mahanian theory.” Kaplan
discusses at length a naval “presence
in being” around Oceania to preserve
stability and to dissuade Chinese aggression beyond the first-island-chain
territories. Kaplan concedes Chinese
naval emergence in its near waters and
envisions just beyond them “a stream of
American warships . . . partnered with
warships from India, Japan, and other
democracies all of whom cannot resist
the Chinese embrace, but at the same
time are forced to balance against it.”
The resulting tension along the Eurasian rimlands would surprise neither
Mackinder nor Spykman, and evokes
Mahan’s notion of democratic concerts.
The publisher is to be congratulated
for the superb maps included. If there
is one oversight, it is that Kaplan could
have built much of his narrative around
the concept of “shatter belts.” Such zones
represent a useful conception that is
consistent with the notion of geographically pivotal states and buffer regions.
The Revenge of Geography is not deterministic but studiously enlightening.
Geography frames but does not decide.
It remains an enduring constraint on
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great states and the policies of statesmen. This book is highly recommended
for readers seeking an intellectually
founded understanding of past theories and strategies and a window into
conflict in the near future. It will be
valuable at all graduate schools in
security studies, and it is particularly
recommended for professional military
education as the foundational reading
for regional studies and geostrategy—
because while geography may not be
destiny, it will shape and influence our
lives in ways we too often overlook.
f. g. hoffman
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Verria, Lawrence, and George Galdorisi. The
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While I do not believe this photo
caused the war to end, I do believe
that the iconic picture by famed Life
magazine photographer Alfred Eisenstaedt of a sailor celebrating in Times
Square on 14 August 1945 served for
many as the joyous and emotional end
to that horrible conflict. The picture
captured a moment in time, when a
sailor, a nurse, and a photographer
came together in a moment of jubilation, and then went their separate ways
without saying a word to one another.
When the photo was published in Life
magazine several weeks later, it became very popular, and people began
wondering about the lives of the kissers
on the cover. Neither the magazine nor
the photographer could provide their
identities, and the mystery lingered for
more than sixty years. As far as this
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